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ARTICLES
The Realities of Our Times: The Semiconductor. Chip Protection Act of 1984
and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry
John G. Rauch*
IN[RODUCTION

In the late 1970s, the American semiconductor industry matured
from adolescence into adulthood. The industry moved from the
hustling days of its youth to a midlife crisis. Semiconductor manufacturers met stiff competition within the industry, particularly from
foreign manufacturers. A group of leaders of the industry believed
some of their competitors were competing unfairly by stealing
product designs. Some of these leaders, proponents of chip protection, went to Congress to ask for special legislative protection for
their products. These industry spokesmen cited instances of direct,
photographic copying of semiconductor chips. They presented
graphic evidence of copying by both foreign and domestic manufacturers. The industry asked Congress for an amendment to the
federal copyright law' to outlaw such piracy. The initial proposal,
in 1979, was an amendment to the definition section2 of the copyright code to include expressly the masks used to produce integrated circuit chips as "[p]ictorial, graphic and sculptural works" under
3
the Copyright Act.
* Associate, Foley & Lardner, Chicago; Purdue University, B.S.E.E. 1984; Illinois
Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, .D. 1992. This Article represents
only the present considerations and views of the author, which should not be attributed
to Foley & Lardner or any of it former or present clients.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991).
3. The bill would have added the following sentence to § 101 of the Copyright Act:
"Such pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works shall also include the photographic masks
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However, this proposal was resisted by other leaders of the
industry, the opponents of chip protection. This group asserted that
chip protection would prohibit the practice of reverse engineering.
Reverse engineering is an established industry practice in which a
chip manufacturer photographically reproduces a competitor's chip.
In this way, the manufacturer can analyze and improve the chip
design and thereby enter the market for that chip. The goal of
reverse engineering is generating a new product with "form, fit and
function' compatibility with the old product. Stated another way,
the goal of reverse engineering is producing a chip which directly
replaces the competitor's chip and which can be manufactured for
less. Lower manufacturing costs allow lower sales prices and allow the manufacturer to capture market share. Opponents of chip
protection regarded reverse engineering as essential to a competitive marketplace. They therefore resisted efforts to protect chip
designs.
Due to this resistance, the 1979 effort to amend the Copyright
Act to protect chips failed. In 1983, however, industry representatives gave unanimous support to a sui generis approach to the problem. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 ("the Chip
Act") was a wholly new type of intellectual property protection
independent of copyright and patent5 protection. The Chip Act was
more than an amendment to the Copyright Act. Most importantly,
the Chip Act provided for legitimate reverse engineering. The
semiconductor industry insisted this protection was absolutely vital
to its continued good health. Congress agreed.
During the 1983 hearings on the bill that became the Chip Act,
Representative Norman Mineta, a Member of Congress from California's Silicon Valley, made a statement urging passage of the
bill.6 Representative Mineta contended that protection of the semi-

used to imprint patterns on integrated circuit chips and include the imprinted patterns
themselves even though they are used in connection with the manufacture of, or incorpo-

rated in a useful article." H.R. 1007, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
6. The Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 1028 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
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conductor industry was essential to long-term American economic
interests and that chip makers needed incentives and protection.
According to him, the Copyright Act should be kept up to date by
including integrated circuits within its scope. Representative
Mineta stated "[ojur laws must be adapted to fit the realities of our
times."7 Unfortunately, the Chip Act passed by Congress was
adapted to the realities of the 1970s, not the 1990s.
After seven years, only one appellate opinion involving the
Chip Act has been reported. 8 The "vital protection" provided by
the Chip Act has played only a small part in protecting the rights
of chip makers. This Article examines the background of the Chip
Act and what happened to the American semiconductor industry
during the 1980s. Part One of this Article examines the problems
cited by the industry in 1979 and 1983 in attempting to justify the
Chip Act, as well as the arguments by those opposed to the Chip
Act within the industry. Part Two of this Article presents the elements of the protection provided by Congress in the Chip Act,
including limitations, such as reverse engineering, which restrict the
effectiveness of the Chip Act. Lastly, Part Three of this Article
examines these limitations as well as changes in the semiconductor
industry and in semiconductor technology which have largely
mooted the Chip Act.
I. WHAT THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY WAS COMPLAINING

ABOUT
A. Introduction: The Problem
The semiconductor industry grew up as one of the miracles of
American industry. -Semiconductor design and manufacturing technology leapt ahead each year. The industry attracted bright, aggressive men and women. They created new devices and ways to
make those devices. They put those devices in new products.
They sold those new products to customers in government and
Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House Hearings]

(statement of Rep. Mineta).
7. Id.
8. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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industry. They made a lot of money in the process.
During the first twenty years of its existence, the semiconductor
industry displayed a gold-rush mentality. In the 1960s, the industry's growth was fueled by government expenditures on the space
program and the Vietnam war. The 1970s saw the advance of
semiconductors into consumer and business applications. These
early years frequently featured twenty percent annual growth in
revenues for the industry and even more spectacular results for
particular firms and individuals. From a single parent-Fairchild
Camera and Instrument Corp.-dozens of start-up and spinoff companies were created to capitalize on the drive and innovation of its
founders. 9 Venture capitalists flocked to Silicon Valley to mine
this boom. The Federal Trade Commission captured the spirit of
the industry in a 1977 report:
The most important feature of this industry is its rapid rate
of innovation and technological change. Although it has a
high rate of expenditures in research and development,
those expenditures can only partly explain the rapid rate of
innovation. Other features that seem equally or more important are the use of second sourcing, the mobility of technical personnel, and the relatively low cost and ease of entry into the industry. The fact that companies can rapidly
copy each other is very important. This rapid copying is
the result of the mobility of personnel from firm to firm
and the unwillingness of most firms to bring trade secret or
patent infringement suits. The rapid innovation and copying can also be explained by the number of times executive
and technical personnel have left large firms to set up their
own small, spin-off firms. 10

9. By 1979, approximately 35 companies had been formed by former Fairchild
employees, including National Semiconductor Corp., Intel Corp., and Advanced Micro
Devices Inc. Copyright Protection for Imprinted Design Patterns on Semiconductor
Chips; Hearing on H.R. 1007 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59
(1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Hearings].
10. Id. at 52 (statement of John Finch, Vice President and General Manager of
Semiconductor Production, National Semiconductor Corp., quoting FEDERAL TRADE
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Thus, the Silicon Valley gold rush was fueled by the ready portability of intellectual property.
The booming semiconductor industry of the 1970s was largely
an American phenomenon. Most of the companies involved were
American; most were located in a few square miles of the Santa
Clara Valley in California. Japanese and European manufacturers
trailed the Americans in manufachuring technology. The bulk of
the market was American, too. Seventy percent of the market for
integrated circuits was in the United States." Technology flowed
easily between American semiconductor manufacturers and was
readily available to international competitors.
The Japanese, in particular, took an interest in this market.
Large Japanese corporations began investing in semiconductor
technology. The factors cited in the Federal Trade Commission
report eased the Japanese entry into the industry. 2 The relaxed
attitude of U.S. manufacturers toward second sourcing and mobility
of personnel and intellectual property allowed the Japanese access
to American technology. Japanese chip makers used reverse engineering to develop market share in the same -way that American
manufacturers did. U.S. reluctance to press trade secret or patent
infringements suits made taking technology a low-risk venture.
The Japanese firms which developed semiconductor technology
were vertically integrated manufacturers of consumer and electronic
goods. Thus, they already had in place in-house markets for their
semiconductor products. In time, these firms sought to profit from
in-house technologies through external sales. The Japanese took
what the Americans had, learned from-it, and began to compete.
At the same time as competition for American firms increased,
the cost of designing and making chips escalated. Innovative designs required increasingly expensive manufacturing processes to
overcome physical limitations. Manufacturers had to retool with
expensive new capital equipment for each new product generation.

COMM'N, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, STAFF REPORT ON SEMICONDUCrOR INDUSTRY

(1977)).
11. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 71.
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, the mechanisms for technological mobility-lax enforcement of intellectual property rights and highly mobile technical personnel 3-- remained in place.
The increased competition and cost of capital prompted a group
of U.S. integrated circuit manufacturers to seek protection from
Congress. These proponents of chip protection sought to control
the mobility of technology by limiting access to existing designs.
They believed the wholesale copying of chip designs, or "piracy,"
threatened their investments in capital equipment. They demanded
protection from pirates' ability to steal market share by stealing
design and manufacturing technology.
No existing form of intellectual property adequately covered
integrated circuits. Most integrated circuit layouts lack the novelty
or nonobviousness necessary for patent protection.' 4 Once a product such as an integrated circuit -is marketed, any trade secrets it
contains are no longer secret, a prerequisite for protection. 5 Some
other form of protection was necessary. Copyright protection,
available for'both two-dimensional pictorial and graphic works as
well as three-dimensional sculptural works, 6 was an obvious choice
for protecting chips.
The article to be protected was a chip made of silicon or other
semiconductor material. Patterns etched in its surface define transistors and other circuit devices as well as the wires which interconnect them. 7 The patterns originate on a mask, a plate of clear
quartz containing opaque geometric shapes corresponding to the
patterns to be etched. Production of a completed semiconductor
chip may require up to 20 masks, each containing patterns for a

13. See id.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5752; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988) (statutory standards for
patentability).
15. See, e.g., Illinois Trade Secrets Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, para. 352(d)(2)

(1992) (owner must make reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy of a trade secret).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988).
17. A detailed description of semiconductor manufacturing technology is beyond the
scope of this paper. For such a description, see H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 1114, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5760-63.
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different layer." Each mask acts as a stencil in patterning the
silicon. The patterns are "written" on the mask by an electron
beam controlled by a computer and using coordinates that describe
the geometric shapes stored in a computer file. The computer file
is created by a layout designer using a graphics workstation.19 The

integrated circuit thus consists of a series of patterns which cooperate to form a functioning circuit.
Thus, copyright protection seemed closest to what the semiconductor industry wanted in 1979, proprietary rights in a two- or
three-dimensional manufactured article. In 1979, however, the
application of copyright law to integrated circuits was not clear.2
The Copyright Act prohibits registration of "useful articles" as
pictorial, graphic or sculptural works. 21 The Copyright Office took
the position that integrated circuits were purely utilitarian and had
refused to register them.22 Consequently, supporters of protection
for integrated circuits determined to petition Congress to amend the
Copyright Act to provide protection specifically for integrated circuit chips.'
B. The Argument For Protection
The supporters of integrated circuit copyright protection cited
the skyrocketing expense of chip development and the relative ease
of chip piracy as motivation for the bill. In 1969, a typical integrated circuit required 10 person-months to design. In 1979, owing

18. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.

20. In 1979, issues of copyright in technologically new media such as computer
software had not yet been addressed by the courts. See, e.g., Apple Computer Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer program embedded
in a ROM is copyrightable; computer object code and operating system programs are
copyrightable), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The copyright for a computer
program in a ROM, however, is different from the copyright for the ROM chip itself in
the same way that numbers recorded on a business form are different from the blank form
itself.
21. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
22. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 4, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5753.
23. See supra note 3.
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to increased complexity and higher levels of integration, the typical
circuit required 200 person-months to design.' This increase in
complexity was made possible by advancing the level of manufacturing technology, primarily the ability to create finer line widths
on masks and to print those on silicon chips reliably35 The ability
to put smaller devices closer together on a chip in turn allowed
engineers to put more devices on the same size chip. The close
packing and interconnection of these additional devices accounted
for the additional design time.2 6 More devices per chip allowed
design of more advanced chips such as microprocessors.
These more advanced chips were often created as members of
a related "family" of devices2 For example, a microprocessor
family often includes a math coprocessor to speed mathematical
calculations. The family may include a separate chip to handle
input-output operations between the microprocessor and a variety
of peripheral devices. DRAMs28 require a periodic refresh operation in order to maintain stored data. Chips were developed to
handle the refresh operation independently. The supporters of
integrated circuit protection cited the development costs of these
families of advanced chips as justifying the legislation.
At the 1983 hearings, Intel noted the enormous cost of developing a family of chips for a legitimate semiconductor manufacturer.29
In addition to the main microprocessor chip, the manufacturer had
to develop additional chips in the family, software for the chip, and

24. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 39 (statement of Dr. Andrew S. Grove,
President of Intel Corp., appearing on behalf of American Electronics Association).

25. More advanced seniconductor processes also typically require more mask layers
to produce a completed device. For example, the advance from NMOS technology to
CMOS, while having the advantage of greatly reducing power consumption, adds several
more masks to the manufacturing process.
26. Of course, the additional devices form a more complex circuit which itself
requires additional design and debug time.
27. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 28.
28. Dynamic Random Access Memory chips.
29. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 34 (statement of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr.,
Corporate Counsel and Secretary of Intel Corp., appearing on behalf of Semiconductor
Industry Association).
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computers to help the customer develop his own software.3° Intel
also noted that the cost of developing the market for the family of
chips could equal the research and development cost for the chips 1
Intel summarized the "[t]ypical cost of a complete family of chips":
Research and Development Cost for the Main Chip
Research and Development Cost of Additional Chips,
Development Tools, and Software
Market Development Cost
TOTAL

$4 million
$40 million
$36 million
$80 million3 2

For Intel and other supporters of integrated circuit protection, the
stakes were very high.
The great fear of the supporters of the bill was chip piracy.
The pirates were competing semiconductor manufacturers who
legitimately purchased integrated circuits, copied them, and began
manufacturing and selling competing chips. The- pirate removed
the lid of the package containing the chip in order to access the
chip.33 The pirate then photographed the top layer of the chip at
high magnification. This layer contains the final layer of interconnect metal.34 The pirate then duplicated the layout of the chip's top
level on his own graphics workstation using the precise measurements taken from the photograph. When the top level of the pirated copy was completed, the pirate then etched away the top level
of the chip he was copying to expose the layer beneath, containing
the first interconnect layer.35 This layer, and all the layers beneath,
were photographed and duplicated in the same manner. The result
was a precise duplicate of the layout of the pirated chip.36 From
this layout, the pirate could manufacture 37 and market in direct

30. Id. at 28.
31. Id.
32. Id.

33. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 27.
34. Interconnect metal is analogous to wires that interconnect portions of the circuit.

35. This layer is typically made of metal or polysilicon and is used to interconnect
individual devices such as transistors and resistors.
36. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 27.
37. The pirate's ability to manufacture the design which he has pirated assumes he
has access to manufacturing process technology compatible with that of the original
design. See 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 211 (statement of Dr. Christopher K.
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competition with the original chip.
The supporters of chip protection had graphic evidence of pira-

cy. Dr. Andrew S. Grove, president of Intel, presented photographs
of an Intel DRAM chip and an exact copy of the Intel chip produced by the Japanese firm Toshiba.38 Intel had purchased the
Toshiba chip on the open market, where it was competing with
Intel chips. 39 Intel also produced photos of a Soviet-made memory
chip that was a copy of another Intel product. 4° A representative

of Intersil testified that in the late 1970s, his company produced a
successful line of analog-to-digital converter chips. 41 The chips

were copied by another Silicon Valley manufacturer and marketed

in competition with Intersil's chips.
The potential profits to the pirate were tremendous. As noted
by Intel, the pirate need not copy an entire family of chips. 42 The
pirate chose the high volume products where his total profits could
be maximized. The cost to the pirate of photographically copying
the chip was around $100,000.4' Other than copying and manufac-

Layton, Vice President of RTP Operations, Intersil Inc., appearing on behalf of Semiconductor Industry Association, noting that the pirate's job is done after copying the chip if
"the copier's manufacturing process is substantially the same as the chip originator's
process"); see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
38. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 40.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 207.

42. Id. at 28.
43. Id. This is the figure cited by Intel at the 1983 House Hearings. The House
Report on the Chip Act gave the pirate's cost as "less than $50,000." H.R. REP. No. 781,
supra note 14, at 11-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5751. The $50,000 figure
appears to come from the statement of L. J. Sevin, President of Mostek Corp., during the
1979 hearings. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 31 ("There is a company in Japan
that can be hired to copy it in less than three months for less than $50 thousand."). The
Semiconductor Industry Association submitted an analysis of the economics of chip piracy
to the 1983 hearings which also cited the $50,000 figure. 1983 House Hearings,supra
note 6, at 178.
It is not clear what either of these amounts include. Expenses for the pirate should
include cameras and film, microscope, probes, chemicals and related equipment, computer
aided design workstation, mask costs, manufacturing costs, and other labor and materials.
A one-time pirate would have to recoup these costs from a single chip. Repeated piracy
would allow amortization over several copied chips.
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turing costs, the cost to the pirate was small. He capitalized on the
legitimate manufacturer's research and development costs as embodied in the copied chip. 4 The market for the chip was fully
developed by the legitimate manufacturer. 45 After recapturing his
minimal copying and manufacturing expenditures, the pirate was in
a position of pure profit. The pirate had a significant economic
advantage over the legitimate manufacturer.
The legitimate manufacturer initially set its new product prices
high. When the legitimate manufacturer first introduced the family
of chips, it had a monopoly over the market for those devices. The
legitimate manufacturer thus could set prices high enough to cover
its high development costs and earn a profit.4 6 These profits could
then be invested in other research and development costs.47 Shortterm monopoly pricing created the incentive that allowed the innovative firm to conduct research and development.4 8
In contrast to the high prices required by the legitimate manufacturer, the pirate required a price high enough only to cover his
44. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 28.

45. Id.
46. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 183; The SemiconductorChip Protection
Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 1201 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1983) [hereinafter

1983 Senate Hearings] (submitted statement of Semiconductor Industry Association).
47. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 183; 1983 Senate Hearings,supra note
46, at 126.

48. More recently, firms such as Intel have attempted to retain monopoly profits by
limiting legitimate access to their chips by other firms and by aggressively protecting their
intellectual property rights on all fronts. See Fred Davis, AMJ) 386 Chips Make It to
Market Despite Intel Impediments, PC WK., Apr. 15, 1991, at 150 (Intel liable in arbitration for damages for breach of contract with AMD to second source Intel's 80386 microprocessor, arbitrator calling Intel's conduct "a classic example of a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, preaching good faith but practicing duplicity"); Intel Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (memorandum of
intended decision concluding that the unregistered trademark "386" is generic and therefore not able to be protected). This aggressive posture reflects the increased competition
in the market and the failure of the Chip Act to accomplish its goals. See Part mII, infra.
This also reflects the revitalization of patent law following Congress's establishment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit See Robert L. Risberg, Jr.,
Comment, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation Under the Semiconductor Chip

ProtectionAct: Unmasking the Spectre of Chip PiracyIn An Era of Diverse and Incom-

patible ProcessTechnologies, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 241.
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copying and manufacturing costs. Also, the pirate had no need to
fund research and development of future products.49 In order to
gain market share from the legitimate producer, the pirate is in a
position to use price as a weapon.50 At the extreme, the pirate
could set a price so low as to drive the legitimate manufacturer
from the market.-"
Thus, the argument in favor of new protection for integrated
circuits focused on the disincentive to innovative research and
development created by pirating.52 Increasing product complexity
is an inherent attribute of the semiconductor industry. 3 That increasing complexity created increasing design costs and design
risks. The increasing costs resulted from new process development
and the added design time. The risks resulted from the uncertainty
that a new chip would function, or would be successful on the
market, or would be copied.54 As business entities, semiconductor
manufacturers can gauge the technological and marketing risks. By
seeking legal protection for integrated circuit designs, the proponents of protection for integrated circuits sought to eliminate the
risk of copying, which was largely beyond their control.
C. The Argument Against Protection
Other members of the semiconductor industry, the opponents of
chip protection, were less concerned about this risk. The opponents of the 1979 bill to provide copyright protection for integrated
circuits asserted several legal and commercial arguments against
the bill. According to these arguments, by adding integrated circuit
masks to the definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural

49. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 184; 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note

46, at 127 (submitted statement of Semiconductor Industry Association).
50. 1983 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 28 (statement of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr.).
51. Id. at 184; 1983 Senate Hearings,supra note 46, at 127 (submitted statement of

Semiconductor Industry Association).
52. 1983 House Hearings,supranote 6, at 28 (statement of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr.);
id. at 212 (statement of Dr. Christopher K. Layton); 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9,
at 27 (statement of L. L Sevin); id. at 32 (statement of Dr. Andrew S.Grove).
53. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 40 (statement of Dr. Andrew S. Grove).
54. Id.
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works," 55 the bill violated fundamental principles of copyright law.
Also, opponents believed the bill created unpredictable hazards for
businesses in the industry.
Opponents of the bill relied primarily on legal arguments

against amending the Copyright Act of 1976.56 They asserted that
copyright protection would not be helpful because of the Useful

Article Doctrine of copyright law. Under this doctrine, copyright
does not subsist in "useful articles."57 A useful article has some
"intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information."5' The rationale
of the Useful Article Doctrine is the denial of copyright where the

use of the idea requires copying the work itself.59
Opponents of H.R. 1007 believed that integrated circuits are
useful articles.' They asserted that the semiconductor industry of
61
1979 was built on second sourcing other manufacturers' products.
Chips which are second sourced must have identical functionality
at each pin. Duplicating functionality required copying, especially

in smaller, less complicated chips.62 Thus, use of the chip required
its copying, the very definition of a useftil article. Under the Use55. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. II 1991).
56. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
57. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright does not extend to any idea
or method); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (codifying the doctrine of Baker v. Selden); 17
U.S.C. 113(b) (1988) (limiting rights in works portraying useful articles under the Copyright Act of 1976 to those under the Copyright Act of 1909); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1992)
(Copyright Office regulation providing that "[ildeas, plans, methods, systems, or devices,
as distinguished from the particular manner in which they are expressed or described in
a writing," are not subject to copyright).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
59. Baker, 101 U.S. 99.
60. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 53-54 (statement of John Finch).
61. Second sourcing is the production by one manufacturer of a product functionally
identical to another manufacturer's product. Second sourcing may be done by agreement
between the manufacturers and may even involve the transfer of technology, including
masks, between the manufacturers. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 68 (statement
of James M. Early, Director of Research and Development, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp.). The rationale is to provide customers with multiple sources for the product,
thereby assuring the customer of product availability.
62. Arguably, such chips were the bread and butter of the companies opposing H.R.
1007 in 1979.
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ful Article Doctrine, no copyright could subsist in such a work.
Opponents of the bill also analogized integrated circuit masks
to architectural plans.63 Traditionally, the copyright in a set of
architectural plans protects only against copying the plans to produce another set of plans. 4 The copyright in the plans does not
include any exclusive right to construct the building described in
the plans nor any right to prevent others from copying the completed building made from the plans.65 This rule is based on the Useful Article Doctrine of copyright law. According to the opponents
of integrated circuit protection, integrated circuit masks are useful

articles like architectural plans. Therefore, copyright in the masks
would not give the owner the right to prevent copying of the completed chip made from the masks. 66 Even if copyright subsisted in
the masks, the protection would be useless to stop chip piracy.
Opponents of protection also analogized integrated circuit

masks to the end product produced by a numerically controlled
machine tool. 67 According to this analogy, the structure and design
of a chip is so complex that a substantial part of the design is typi-

cally accomplished by a computer. Computer simulations of the
circuit verify the function and performance of the design. 'The
computer also 'draws' the layout of the chip," 68 then generates the
63. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 53.
64. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972); Scholz Homes,
Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). But see 17 U.S.C. § 120 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991) (defining proprietary

rights in architectural works, amendment effective Dec. 1, 1990); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988
& Supp. 111 1991) (definition of "architectural work" includes a building, architectural
plans or drawings, amendment effective Dec. 1, 1990).
65. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 53.
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Id. The assertion that a computer draws the layout of the chip is directly in
conflict with other testimony on H.R. 1007. According to L. J. Sevin, circuit designers
produce a schematic drawing which is a symbolic representation of the circuit and the
interconnection of its components. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 30 (statement
of L. J. Sevin). Layout designers, in turn, use the schematic drawing to do the layout
design. Layout design is done by hand and with repeated trial-and-error. Id.; H.R. REP.
No. 781, supra note 14, at 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5761. The goal of
layout design is to draw the necessary circuit elements and to fit them into the minimum
space. A computer is used as a tool to create and display the layout design. However,
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masks used to manufacture the chip. The resulting mask is a computer-implemented design.69 The mask is a useful article, so no
copyright subsists in the mask. However, copyright protection
exists for the computer programs and patent protection exists for
the new, useful, and nonobvious manufacturing processes and prod0
ucts7
The opponents of H.R. 1007 also noted that the bill would only
affect U.S. companies and would afford no international protection.!' Merely amending the definition of pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works in the Copyright Act would not prevent overseas
chip piracy. Foreign pirates could still buy the chips of U.S. manufacturers and copy and sell the chips overseas with impunity.72
Only infringing copying in the U.S. would be hindered by the
amendment.
The strongest opposition to the bill to amend the Copyright Act,
however, was on the issue of reverse engineering and what constitutes "fair use" of integrated circuits.7 3 Much of the growth of the
semiconductor industry has been due to second sourcing.' Competing manufacturers regularly share circuit designs, mask sets, and
documentation necessary to bring a product to the marketplace in
order to assure their customers of an alternate source for the product.7'
Where technology and information are not voluntarily
shared, they are obtained by reverse engineering. Reverse engineering involves examining competing chips in great detail in order
it is no more than a tool. Id.; see 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 26 (statement

of L. J. Sevin that "[1]ayout design is a skill that has successfully resisted 12 years of
attempts at computerization. It requires a level of human ingenuity that will not be
computerized for at least another 25 years, in my opinion, maybe longer-maybe never.").
In light of this, any claim that a computer draws the layout of the chip seems disingenuous.
69. Id. at 54.
70. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988) (defining statutory requirements for patentability).
71. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 54 (statement of John Finch).
72. Id.

73. Id. at 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1H 1991) (defining the fair use
of a copyrighted work).
74. See supra text accompanying note 10; supra note 61.
75. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 68 (statement of James M. Early).
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to use the information obtained in improved designs. 76 Reverse
engineering is recognized by all as a legitimate activity that should
not be penalized.77
Fair use began as a judicially created defense to a suit for copyright infringement. The doctrine of fair use allows the use of a
copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without the consent of
the owner of the copyright. The doctrine allows courts to avoid the
rigid application of the copyright law when that rigidity would
stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to foster.a
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 codifies fair use.7 9
Opponents of the bill to amend the Copyright Act to include
integrated circuits questioned to what extent reverse engineering
would constitute a fair use.80 They believed that reverse engineering, as legitimate copying, should be protected. However, the bill
did not include reverse engineering in the definition of fair use.
From the perspective of a manufacturer contemplating reverse engineering, copying a competitor's chip before judicial determination
of the scope of fair use as applied to reverse engineering would be
risky. On the other hand, to wait for a favorable judicial ruling
could force the manufacturer out of business due to his inability to
compete successfully.. Each manufacturer who sought to produce
a particular chip would have to "reinvent the wheel," expensively
duplicating the research and development efforts embodied in the
chip. 81 This threatened to stagnate competitive growth of te in-

dustry.

82

76. Id. at 69 (statement of John Finch).
77. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 21-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5770-71; S. REP. No. 833, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984). However, the distinction
between legitimate reverse engineering and forbidden piracy is slim. See infra notes 173186 and accompanying text.
78. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d

57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
79.
80.
81.
82.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IR 1991).
1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 54.
Id.
Id.
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D. The Need for a Compromise
In 1979, opponents of chip protection predicted the decline of
the semiconductor industry if the chip protection bill was passed.
According to them, by not providing for legitimate reverse engineering, the bill would impede the flow of technical information
within the industry. On the other hand, supporters of chip protection predicted the decline of the semiconductor industry if the bill
was not passed to protect their investment and innovation. Congressional sponsors of the bill drew the conclusion that protection
for integrated circuit designs was needed, but with a provision for
legitimate reverse engineering. In 1979, H.R. 1007, the bill to
amend the Copyright Act, died without further action.
In 1983, alternative legislation was proposed in both houses of
Congress. The 1983 Senate bill,83 like H.R. 1007 in 1979, was to
amend the current Copyright Act to accommodate integrated circuits. The 1983 House bill,84 on the other hand, was a sui generis
bill creating a wholly new protection for integrated circuits, independent of the Copyright Act. In H.R. 5525, the legislation that
was ultimately passed as the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984,5 Congress opted for the sui gefieris approach.
Congress preferred sui generis protection for integrated circuits
to distinguish the protection given integrated circuits from the protection given books.8 6 The existing Copyright Act created an "author's copyright' for books and other literary and artistic works.
Integrated circuits, unlike literary and artistic works, are essentially
utilitarian and form an integral part of a machine. Integrated circuits thus conflict with the useful articles doctrine of copyright law.
Therefore, Congress created an independent "industrial copyright!'
for integrated-circuits.8

83. S. 1201, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
84. H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), was a substitute amendment for H.R. 1028 in the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice.
85. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
86. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 6, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5755.
87. Id.; see also David I Wilson & James A. LaBarre, The Semiconductor Chip
ProtectionAct of 1984: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
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II. WHAT CONGRESS GAVE THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

The goal of Congress in passing the Chip Act was the protection of the proprietary rights in semiconductor chips. Congress
concluded the best way to accomplisl this was to protect the layers
which form the chips, rather than just the masks from which the
chips are made.
A. What Is Protected
Accordingly, the protection afforded by the Chip Act extends
to a "mask work" fixed in a semiconductor chip product.88 Under
the Chip Act, a mask work is any series of related images which
represent the three-dimensional pattern of metallic, insulating, or
semiconductor material of a semiconductor chip product.8 9 Each
image in the series of images which forms the mask work must
have the pattern of the surface of the semiconductor chip product 0
A semiconductor chip product is defined as any product with
two or more layers of metal, insulating or semiconducting material
arranged on a semiconducting substrate "in accordance with a predetermined pattern." 91 Additionally, the product must be "intended
to perform electronic circuitry functions."92
Mask work protection begins when a mask work is fixed in a
semiconductor chip product. 93 Fixation of a mask work in a semiconductor chip product occurs when the embodiment of the mask

57, 66-70 (1985) (detailing opposition to the copyright approach, S. 1201, by the copyright bar and the Copyright Office).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1) (1988).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2)(A) (1988).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2)(B) (1988).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1)(A). The Chip Act's protection is limited to semiconductor
chips and does not extend to other products such as printed circuit boards or magnetic
media. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 16, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5765.

92. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1)(B). Thus, micro-machined products made using semiconductor processing techniques that do not include electronic circuitry are outside the statute.
93. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. Im 1991) (for literary and artistic works,
copyright protection subsists whenever a work of authorship is fixed in any tangible

medium of expression).
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work is more than transitory.9 4 Thus, fixation occurs only in an
actual semiconductor chip product, not in just a drawing on paper
or an image on a computer screen. 95 Fixation in an actual chip
brings the mask work within the protection of § 902.9' However,
the exclusive rights granted by the Chip Act9 extend to other types
of fixation, such as a database tape containing the coordinates of

the geometries of the mask work.98
The Chip Act includes an originality requirement. The Chip
Act does not cover a mask work which is not original or which

embodies "designs that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in the
semiconductor industry." 99 Thus, some minimal level of creativity

is required.1°° Additionally, Congress determined that public domain works, those which are "staple, commonplace or familiar,"
may not be turned into proprietary rights via the Chip Act.10 1 The
requirement of originality under the Chip Act is constitutionally
mandated and is analogous to originality for copyright in literary
and artistic works."°

94. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3) (1988).
95. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5765.
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 902 (1988) (providing protection for owners of mask works
under treaty obligations).
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 905 (1988) (creating exclusive rights in mask works).
98. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5766.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b).
100. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 19, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5768.
101. Id.
102. "Congress shall have the power.. . To secure to Authors and Inventors for
limited Times the exclusive Rights to their Writings and Inventions." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright originality requirement requires only that the "author" contributed to "a writing" something more than a trivial variation. Alfred Bell & Co., v. Catalda
Fine Arts Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (citing Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp.,
150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945)). Section 901(4) of the Chip Act "adopts the essence of the
customary copyright law concept of originality and applies it to mask works... "'H.R.
REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 17, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5766.
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B. The ProtectionProvided

Rights under the act belong to the owner of the mask work.'0 3
The owner is generally .the creator of the mask work. For a mask
work created within the scope of a person's employment, the owner
of the mask Work is the employer of the person who created the

mask work.'04 The owner of rights in a mask work may transfer
or license any of those rights.'0 5 Transfer must be by signed writ-°6

ten instrument which may be recorded in the Copyright Office.'

Ownership of mask works is similar to ownership of literary and

artistic works. under the Copyright Act.'0 7

The Chip Act provides the owner of a mask work three exclu-

sive rights. 08 First is the right to reproduce the mask work in
whole or in part.' 9 In an infringemeit action, the standard for
infringement is substantial similarity." A party who produces a
mask work that is substantialy similar to a previously registered

mask work"' under the Chip Act is liable for infringement of the
exclusive reproduction right of § 905. Even reproduction of a part
103. 17 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1988).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(6) (1988). Creation of mask works by employees acting
within the scope of their employment as engineers or mask layout designers is doubtless
the most common occurrence within the serniconductor industry.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1988). The provisions for transfer of mask work rights are
generally similar to provisions for transfer of copyright and patent rights. H.R. REP. No.
781, supra note 14, at 19-20, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5768-69. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d) (1988) (transfer of copyright rights); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (transfer of patent

rights).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 903 (1988).
107. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 17, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5766. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. I 1991) (defining a literary or artistic
work made for hire); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
("employee" under § 101 of the Copyright Act to be understood in light of the general
common law of agency).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 905 (1988).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 905(1); H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 20, reprintedin 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5769. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988) (reproduction right for copyright in literary and artistic works).
110. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5769 ("if this was otherwise, an infringer could immunize himself by adding a mistake
to a mask work copied in its entirety").
111. Registration is a prerequisite to a suit for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 910(b)(1)
(1988).
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of a mask work is infringement of the reproduction right if that
part is material.112 The Chip Act does not prohibit independent
production of a mask work;" 3 it only prohibits reproduction of
another's mask work.
The second exclusive right under the Chip Act is the distribution right." 4 Distribution includes any transfer of a semiconductor
chip product embodying the mask work." 5 Distribution of a product which incorporates a chip, such as a computer, is also distribution of the chip within the Chip Act. 1 6 The distribution right includes the right to import chips embodying the mask work." 7
The third exclusive right under the Chip Act prohibits contributory infringement. 18 Only the owner of a mask work may "induce
or knowingly cause another person!' to reproduce or distribute a
mask work or chip embodying a mask work." 9 No similar provision exists for copyright in literary and artistic works.120
Before any of the exclusive rights under the Chip Act attach,
the owner of the mask work must register the work with the Copyright Office.121 Unlike copyright in artistic and literary works
where copyright registration is voluntary,'22 the Chip Act requires
registration within a reasonable time at the risk of forfeiture of
rights.'2 If the owner does not register within two years of the
112. Brooktre Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
113. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 491,494 (S.D.
Cal. 1988).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 905(2); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988) (distribution right of
copyright in artistic and literary works).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(4) (1988).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 901(b) (1988).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 905; see also 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988) (importation right of
copyright of literary and artistic works).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 905.
119. Id.
120. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 21, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5770. But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1988) (defining contributory infringement of patent
rights).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 908 (1988).
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988) ("such registration is not a condition of copyright
protection").
123. See H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 24, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 5773. (Congress's rationale is greater certainty of rights for both the public and the
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date of first commercial exploitation, the mask work falls into the
public domain.1 24 Registration requires application via a form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and deposit of four chips
embodying the mask work along with plots or photographs of each
layer of the work. 5 The Copyright Office examines the form and
deposited materials only to ensure the claim is facially in compliance with the statute and regulations.1 26 The Copyright Office does
not examine the prior art as under the patent laws. 2 7
The owner of the mask work may affix notice to the mask work
and to any masks and chips made therefrom. 128 Notice may consist
of the letter "M" in a circle, the symbol *M*, or "the words 'mask
force,""' 29 along with the name of.the owner of the mask work.
While optional, provision of notice constitutes prima facie evidence
of notice to others that the mask work is protected. 3 °
Protection under the Chip Act extends for a term of ten years.' 3 '

owners of the mask works). •
124. 17 U.S.C. § 908(a).
125. 37 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 211.5 (1992).
126. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 25, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5774.
127. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (defining the appropriate
examination of a patent application with respect to prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 909(a) (1988).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 909 (b)(1) (1988). The "mask force" form of notice is clearly a
typographical error in the statute, Pub. L. No. 98-620, Title I, § 302, 98 Stat. 3352
(1984), and should be "mask work." The Copyright Office regulations correctly list this
form of notice as "mask work." 37 C.F.R. § 211.6(b)(1) (1992). However, because area
on the surface of integrated circuits is so precious, it is likely that the creator of a mask
work would choose one of the other, shorter, forms of notice. Therefore, this error should
not be of consequence to mask work registrants.
130. H.R-. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 25, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5774.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 904 (1988). Protection under the 1979 amendment to the Copyright
Act, H.R. 1007, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), would have been the same as protection for
literary and artistic works-generally 75 to 100 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988)
(duration of copyright). This lengthy term of protection, relative to rapidly changing
technology, was cited by opponents of H.R. 1007. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9,
at 54. The strongest supporter of protection for semiconductor chips, Dr. Andrew S.
Grove, President of Intel Corp. and a representative of the American Electronics Association, admitted that a 75 year term of protection was not necessary and suggested a term
of 7 to 15 years was adequate protection. Id. at 41.
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Protection begins on the date of a mask work's first commercial
exploitation, or the date of registration of the mask work, which
ever occurs first.'32
Registration is a prerequisite to a suit for infringement of any
of the exclusive rights in a mask work.133 Remedies for infringement include temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
and permanent injunctions." The court may order the impoundment of infinging chips, masks, or database tapes.' 35 If infringement is found, the court may order destruction of infringing products.

36

The court may award actual damages as well as the in-

fringer's profits. 137 Alternatively, the court may award statutory
damages up to $250,000.'13 Lastly, the court may award costs and
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 3 9 The Chip Act includes a
three-year statute of limitations.Y

132. 17 U.S.C. § 904.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 910(b)(1) (1988). Congress intended that the concept of infringement of mask work rights be the same as infringement of an author's rights under copyright. Concepts of copyright law relative to infringement are to apply to actions under
the Chip Act. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 26, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5775. These include substantial similarity as the standard for infringement, see, e.g.,
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (establishing a bifurcated test of substantial similarity); the idea-expression dichotomy, see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(copyright does not extend to any idea); and merger of idea and expression when an idea
can be expressed in only a limited number of ways, see Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 911(a) (1988).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 911(e)(1) (1988).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 911(e)(2) (1988).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 911(b) (1988).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 911(c) (1988). But see 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988) (statutory damages for copyright violation limited to $20,000 unless the infringement was willful in
which case the court may increase the award to not more than $100,000); see H.R. REP.
No. 781, supra note 14, at 27, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5776 (the difference in
statutory damages reflects the substantial front-end costs of chip creation, the impact of
disincentives to create new technology, and the absence of criminal sanctions).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 911(0 (1988); see Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (as with other copyright litigation, the
award of costs and fees should be the rule rather than the exception), affd, 977 F.2d 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 911(d) (1988).
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C. Limitations on Protection
While the penalties for infringement are stiff, they include significant limitations that may restrict the effectiveness of protection.
As demanded by the opponents of protection in 1979,141 reverse
engineering is a defense to a charge of mask work infringement. 142
Specifically, a competitor or other person may legitimately reproduce a mask work for the purpose of "teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques" employed in the mask work. 43
That person may then reproduce what he learns in another mask
work for sale. 14" A competitor may thus legitimately appropriate
a registered mask work if he employs "substantial study and analysis" of a chip, not mere copying. 45 The competitor may demonstrate such study and analysis by showing a paper trail of documentation. 46147One who reverse engineers, rather than copies, is not
an infringer.
A second limitation on the protection provided by the Chip Act
is the First Sale Doctrine. 4 This doctrine is a carryover from
traditional copyright law. 49 The doctrine limits control by the
owner of mask work rights over a particular semiconductor chip
once the chip has left the owner's hands. A purchaser of the chip
can use or transfer the chip as he sees fit. He need not have authority of the owner of the mask work rights that subsist in that
chip. The purchaser may not reproduce the chip, however. 50 The
rationale of the First Sale Doctrine is to prevent the owner of mask
141. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.

142. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1988).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2).
145. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5771.
146. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1570 (Fed.

Cir. 1992); see H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5770 ("paper trail" of legitimate reverse engineering distinguishes it from chip piracy).
147. On the distinction between copying and reverse engineering, see infra Part I1I.

148. 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1988).
149. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 23, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5772. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) (Copyright Act codification of the First Sale Doc-

trine).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 906(b).
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work rights from limiting the free alienability of the goods of the
bona fide purchaser. Out of respect for this principle, the Chip Act
limits the extent to which the creator of a mask work can control
his product.
The final significant limitation on the exclusive rights of mask
work owners protects innocent infringers. An innocent infringer is
one who buys and uses a chip in good faith and without notice of
the protection afforded the mask work. 151 The innocent infringer
is not liable at all for sale or distribution of infringing chips before
he has notice that the chips are protected by the Chip Act. 52 After
receiving notice, the innocent infringer 5 3 is liable only for a reasonable royalty on infringing chips he sells. 54 His immunity extends to his customers for those chips or products incorporating
55
those chips.
Thus, in the Chip Act, Congress reached a compromise. Congress gave both the supporters and opponents of protection for
integrated circuits what they wanted. Supporters of chip protection
sought a remedy for chip piracy, since the literal copying of their
products threatened continued competitiveness. They insisted protection was vital. Opponents of chip protection demanded a limitation on their liability. They believed reverse engineering was a
practice as old as the industry and fundamental to continued competitiveness. They, too, insisted limitation was vital. In the Chip
Act, Congress provided severe penalties upon a finding of infringement. However, infringement under the Act may be difficult to
find.
III.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH WHAT CONGRESS GAVE THE SEMI-

CONDUCTOR INDUSTRY?

The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 was drafted in
response to industrial problems of the 1970s. However, the Chip

151. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(7) (1988).

152. 17 U.S.C. § 907(a)(1) (1988).
153. Perhaps "formerly innocent infringer" is more accurate.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 907(a)(2) (1988).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 907(c) (1988).
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Act provided a huge hole in its coverage by exempting reverse
engineering from liability. In addition, the semiconductor industry
and the technology it relies on have changed, mooting the Chip
Act. The opportunities for and benefits from piracy no longer
exist.
A. Technology and the Industry Have Changed
For chip piracy to work, the pirate must have access to the
same manufacturing technology used by the legitimate manufacturer.156 The pirate copies a legitimate design to produce a set of
masks, each containing the geometries for a particular layer of the
chip. The pirated masks must be compatible with the pirate's manufacturing process to be of any use to the pirate.
In 1979, when semiconductor chip protection was first proposed, processing technology among semiconductor manufacturers
was alike from company to company.'57 Technology used by Intel
was very similar to technology used by Intersil and others. Each
firm used substantially the same mask layers along with substantially the same processing steps. A manufacturer could copy another firm's chip only because it could use the copied masks on its
own processing line.158 A pirate could copy a chip, make masks
and contract with a legitimate manufacturer to produce new chips
from the masks. In 1979, standardized technology made piracy
feasible.
By 1992, processing technology has advanced and diverged
within the industry. Changing technology and shrinking geometries
have required additional mask layers. 159 These developments have
led to fabrication procedures which require different or additional
156. See Risberg, supra note 48, at 256.
157. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 38 (statement of Dr. Andrew S. Grove

that, despite minor differences, processing technology is common among manufacturers);
id. at 42 (statement of Roger Borovoy of Intel Corp., confirming this). But see id. at 6970 (statement of John Finch that manufacturing processes are not identical from company
to company).
158. Duplication of a patented process would be patent infringement. The small
differences between processes might be sufficient to defeat such a claim.
159. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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masks for chip manufacturing. While some layers remain common
to technologies used by many firms, many other layers are different. In 1979, a typical process required 8 masks. In 1992, a typical process requires 16 masks. Current processes are much more
complex than past processes.'o
This complexity scuttles the pirate. He can no longer reproduce
161
each layer of a chip and produce a knock-off in three months.
The manufacturing technology used by the legitimate manufacturer
is unique to that manufacturer. The pirate has no production
source for his copied chips. The masks he makes are useless except with the process used by the manufacturer whose chip he
copied. 62 Changes in technology have left the pirate dead in the
water.
Other changes in the semiconductor industry have also reduced
piracy. Formerly, the bulk of sales by U.S. semiconductor manufacturers was in small logic chips that were relatively inexpensive
to design, readily mass produced, and had to be pin-compatible
among many manufacturers. Today, advanced technology has
allowed higher levels of integration and more complex functionality
for integrated circuits.163 Semiconductor manufacturers today focus
their efforts on big chips such as microprocessors, application specific integrated circuits ("ASICs") or digital signal processors
("DSPs"). These big chips realize the benefits of very large scale
integration. These individual chips may be part of a family of
interrelated chips. 164 Also, microprocessors, ASICs, and DSPs
require more from a vendor than just circuit design and manufacturing expertise. They also require software, development tools,
market development, and extensive, expensive customer support. 165

160. The differences in process technology are analogous to differences in computer
software. Software written for an IBM personal computer, circa 1979, will not run on an
Apple personal computer, circa 1991. See Risberg, supra note 48, at 256 n.71.
161. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
162. But see Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1564

(Fed. Cir. 1992) (copying just two mask layers, active area and polysilicon, is sufficient
for violation of the Chip Act); see also Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
705 F. Supp. 491, 495 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
163. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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These chips are part of proprietary systems, each system unique to
its manufacturer. For the manufacturer, the mask layout expense
of such a chip is now relatively small. For the pirate, who is not
interested in supporting what he sells, the value of copying such a
chip is also small. There's no incentive to copy these large proprietary chips.
One type of chip remains susceptible to piracy-the DRAM.
DRAMs are the type of high-volume, low-support, pin-compatible
chips the semiconductor industry of the 1970s was built on. They
are ideally suited for pirating. 166 However, pirating is no longer an
issue even for DRAMs. Technology and industry have changed;
there is no longer an incentive to pirate DRAMS. In the mid1980s, the American semiconductor industry completely abandoned
the DRAM market to the Japanese. U.S. DRAM producers fell
behind their Japanese competitors, who invested heavily in DRAM
research and development and production capacity. By 1986, the
leading Japanese electronics companies controlled eighty percent
of the world market for DRAMs and had gained technological
leadership over virtually all U.S. producers.' 6 Because they trail
technologically, U.S. manufacturers could168not successfully pirate
Japanese DRAMs even if they wanted to.
The expense of new technology and fierce competition has also
changed the semiconductor industry. Barriers to entry into semiconductor manufacturing are high. In 1992, technology required
investment of $200 million to $1 billion in manufacturing process
development, and $250 million to $400 million for each manufacturing line.169 To avoid these costs, many American semiconductor

166. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (Intel presented photographic evidence of copying of its 4127 DRAM by Toshiba).
167. Charles S. Ferguson, Computers and the Coming of the U.S. Keiretsu, HARV.
Bus. Rnv., July-Aug. 1990, at 55.
168. Clearly, the Americans have no desire to compete with the Japanese in the
DRAM market. World DRAM sales rose from $1.5 billion in 1986 to more than $9
billion in 1989. At no time did American chip makers attempt to get back into the
DRAM market. IBM even offered to share its advanced DRAM technology with American chip makers, but found no takers. Id.
169. Id. See D. Lammers & R. Boyd-Merritt, TI To Build SingaporeDRAM Fab,

ELECrONIC ENGNE

G Tm, Apr. 15, 1991, at 1 ($320 million cost of manufactur-
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start-up companies opted to contract for manufacturing services
from domestic and foreign "foundries," manufacturers with excess
capacity. ' 0 The result has been continued net migration of semiconductor manufacturing expertise overseas. Also, the number of
semiconductor firms with manufacturing expertise has declined. 7
Today, six manufacturers hold forty percent of the world market.
Four of the six are Japanese.' 72 The industry, along with its technology, has changed and eliminated the incentive for piracy.
B. Reverse Engineering

In addition to the industrial and technological changes which
made the Chip Act irrelevant, the Chip Act itself provides only
weak protection against pirates. The Chip Act permits reverse
engineering as an affirmative defense to a charge of infringement,
Permissible reverse engineering includes legitimate practices employed in the semiconductor industry before passage of the Chip
Act. Thus, the vast majority of chip copying is outside the coverage of the Chip Act. This result is at odds with the policies of
intellectual property law.
The most important limitation of the Chip Act is the defense of
reverse engineering.'73 Under the Chip Act, it is not an infringeing line to be shared among Texas Instruments, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., Canon, Inc.,
and the Singapore Economic Development Board). But see E. Sack, Exploding the
FablessMyth: A Little Fab Can Go a Long Way, ELECrRONIC ENGIIEERIG TIMES, Apr.
22, 1991, at 35 (Chairman of Zilog, Inc., maintaining that smaller, cheaper fabs can be
competitive and suggesting that stories about $400 million production lines are circulated
to discourage investment).
170. Sean Silverthome, Fabless Chip Companies Thrive Without Making Chips,
INVESTOR's DALY, June 5, 1990, at 35. But see E. Sack, supra note 169, at 35 (Chairman of Zilog, Inc., maintains that the market will not support two profits, one for the
designer and one for the manufacturer).
171. Among the companies presenting testimony to Congress on protection for
semiconductor chips were Mostek Corp., Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., National
Semiconductor Corp., and Intersil, Inc. Mostek was bought by the French firm Thompson. National bought Fairchild. Intersil was already a division of General Electric; it was
merged with RCA's semiconductor operations when GE and RCA merged; Harris Corp.
later bought the combined GE-RCA operation.
172. Ferguson, supra note 167, at 55.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1988); see supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
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ment of rights granted by the Act to reproduce the mask work for
the purpose of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating concepts or techniques embodied in the mask work. 174 Also, it is not an infringement for a person who performs this analysis or evaluation to incorporate the results in an original mask work. 175 Thus, reverse
engineering a chip, even for sale in competition with the original
chip, is a complete defense to a charge of infringement. Unfortunately, the Chip Act and its legislative history do not define what
acts are permissible as reverse engineering nor what differences in
a chip design render it "original."
The report that accompanied the bill which became the Chip
Act in the House of Representatives noted that § 906 codified "the
established industry practice" of reverse engineering. 176 According
to witnesses, copying in the semiconductor industry fell into two
polar categories-piracy and reverse engineering. Piracy was
marked by photographic reproduction of a first chip and direct
incorporation into a second chip.7 Reverse engineering, on the
other hand, was marked by making improvements to an existing
chip by incorporating substantial parts of its design into the second
chip.' 178 The report noted that § 906 was intended to permit and
encourage the practice of reverse engineering. 79 It follows then
that the scope of legitimate reverse engineering prior to the Chip
Act, as presented by the industry to Congress, defines the scope of
permissible reverse engineering under the Chip Act.80
In hearings before Congress, semiconductor industry representatives defined the acts they understood to be embraced by the term
reverse engineering. A representative of National Semiconductor
stated that "[w]e certainly reverse engineer, as do all of our com174. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2).
176. H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 14, at 21, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5770.
177. H.R. REP. NO. 781, supra note 14, at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

5771.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. M. Fisher, Beyond Fair Use: Reverse Engineering and the Semiconductor Chip
ProtectionAct of 1984, COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1986, at 11.
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petitors, which is defined as looking in great detail at competitive
chips and utilizing either in future designs or improved designs, the
things we learn from those chips. It is standard industry practice."18 ' A representative of Fairchild Camera and Instrument provided more detail:
When a competitor brings out a new product, companies in
the business buy the product, electrically test the product
and usually pull the package apart to look at the chip. The
chip is studied under a microscope to determine whether or
not any new engineering procedures are incorporated in the
chip. Photographs are taken of portions of the chip. These
photographs are blown up and dimensions are obtained
from the photographs in an attempt to characterize the
structure of the chip. If the structure appears unique, then
this unique structure might be incorporated by a competitor
in its chip. Alternatively, this unique structure might be
further improved by the competitor and incorporated in a
new product.182
A representative of Intel provided further clarification, noting
that under the reverse engineering provision, a person would have
the right to analyze and understand the chip and determine the
schematic diagram for the circuit embodied in the chip.1'8 The
desirable advantages of reverse engineering are cost reduction and
performance enhancement. In that regard, "[lt is the type of thing
do. It is ongoing engithat even the original designer is going8 to
4
neering, which is perfectly allowable."'
Another Intel representative provided the definitive explanation
of reverse engineering.
When a company decides to become a second source for a
chip already on the market, it will probably want it to be

181. 1979 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 69 (statement of John Finch).
182. Id. at 57 (statement of James M. Early).
183. The Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct of 1983: Hearings on S. 1201 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-

ciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1984) (statement of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr.).
184. Id. at 66.
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equivalent to the first chip not only functionally .but in
terms of specifications and test data; that is, the second chip
would be so fungible with the first chip from a production
standpoint that it would not make any difference which one
was placed into the equipment for which the chip is targeted. In these circumstances, a chip designer may feel that
the fewer design or layout changes that are made from the
first chip, the less likelihood there will be of a
nonequivalence in specifications. This would lead to similarities in layout and appearance, but even when this happens, it is reasonably easy to tell the difference between a
slavish copy and a reverse engineering job. Whenever there
is a true case of reverse engineering, the second firm will
have prepared: a great deal of paper-logic and circuit diagrams, trial layouts, computer simulations of the chip, and
the like; it will also have invested thousands of hours of
work. All of this can be documented with reference to the
firm's ordinary business records. A pirate has no such papers, for the pirate does none of this work." 5
This point was driven home in further testimony on behalf of
Intel. Intel's Corporate Counsel responded to a question by Representative Frank.
Mr. Dunlap. Mr. Frank, you have hit it exactly on the
head. When there is a legitimate job of reverse engineering, there is a very big paper trail, there's computer simulations, there's all kinds of time records, people who have
spent an enormous amount of time understanding and figuring out how to make the design.
Mr. Frank. It is not the extent of the change, but the
extent to which the work can be documented and the corrections can be documented.
Mr. Dunlap. Correct, whenever there is a reverse engineering job, there is a very big paper trail that cannot readi-

185. Id. at 146 (submitted statement of Leslie Vadasz, Senior Vice President, Intel
Corp.).
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ly be fabricated.
Successful assertion of reverse engineering as a defense turns on
production at trial of a paper trail of supporting documents.
Thus, representatives of the industry painted for Congress a
picture of legitimate reverse engineering. According to this picture,
reverse engineering has two steps. First, the reverse engineer examines and analyzes the first chip. Analysis includes electrical
testing, visual inspection and photography, and measurement of the
first chip's geometries. Second, the reverse engineer designs the
second chip. This includes preparation of logic and circuit diagrams based on the analysis of the first chip, computer simulations
of the circuit described in the logic and circuit diagrams, and trial
layouts of new mask works based on the first chip. Both steps of
reverse engineering leave a paper trail.
The evidentiary paper trail of the reverse engineering effort
includes recorded test results, photos of the first chip, the trial
layouts and computer printouts of logic and circuit diagrams, simulation results for the second chip, and the work records of the employees who performed this analysis. The picture of reverse engineering drawn by industry representatives stresses ample evidence
of a legitimate practice. The question is: What is wrong with this
picture?
Reverse engineering, as presented by the semiconductor industry to Congress, has both evidentiary and conceptual problems. A
legitimate reverse engineer is given freedom to appropriate the
intellectual property of another. The legitimate reverse engineer
may leave no paper trail, while the pirate can readily invent one.
The paper trail described in hearings before Congress simply
may not exist. Given current integrated circuit design methodology, even a legitimate reverse engineering job may not produce a
paper trail. Today, virtually all layout work is done on a graphics
workstation because of the need to handle the large amounts of
data that form the layout of an integrated circuit. 87 A chip design-

186. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 36.

187. 1979 House Hearings,supranote 9, at 25. This is in contrast to 1979 technolo-
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er may generate plots of the graphics database for checking work,
but she may not retain these after a working circuit is produced.
She may send and receive interoffice memoranda related to the
reverse engineering effort via electronic mail, with no permanent
copy retained. Current technology allows schematic drawings and
computer simulation files to be extracted directly from the layout
database, without the intervening paper copies.'
Reliance on a paper trail as evidence of reverse engineering
may be misleading. At the time of trial, there may be no existing
paper trail because one was never created. The sole remaining
evidence of the reverse engineering effort may be a computer database tape of the new layout.' 89 This may be indistinguishable from
the trail left by the pirate. On the other hand, the pirate who is
intent on copying can create a suitable paper trail after the fact.
This is particularly troubling since, at trial, establishment of the
defense of reverse engineering will turn on the extent to which
work and changes to the first chip can be documented. Evidence
of reverse engineering is not as clear as Congress was led to believe.
Moreover, a defendant in a suit brought under the Chip Act
may legitimately reverse engineer, as conceived by Congress, only
to have a jury find infringement under the Act. Advanced Micro
Devices ("AMD") sought to enter the market for Brooktree's color
video display chips. 9 0 AMD sought to make its chip form-, fit-,
and function-compatible with Brooktree's. Those who defined reverse engineering for Congress suggested this was the type of activity which embraced reverse engineering. 191 AMD presented evidence of a two-and-one-half-year reverse engineering effort at a

gy that involved cutting and pasting mylar strips.
188. See R. Laurie, The First Year's Experience Under the Chip ProtectionAct, or
"Where Are the PiratesNow That We Need Them?", COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1986, at 21.

189. This is particularly true given the three year statute of limitations under the
Chip Act. 17 U.S.C. § 911(d) (1988).
190. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
191. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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cost of three million dollars. 92 AMD did not produce a "slavish
copy" but extensively analyzed Brooktree's chip. Despite differences which clearly showed AMD's design was not a direct, photographic copy of Brooktree's chip, the jury found AMD infringed
Brooktree's mask work rights.' 93 Brooktree was awarded damages
in excess of $25 million for mask work and patent infringement.
The conceptual basis of reverse engineering is inconsistent with
other forms of intellectual property. Reverse engineering, as originally conceived, was analogous to fair use of a copyrighted
work. 94 Fair use is limited to purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting and teaching.' 95 Commercial uses of -acopyrighted work, in direct competition with the work itself, are presumptively unfair. Section 906(a)(1) of the Chip Act reflects a
similar understanding of reverse engineering. Only the noncommercial activities of teaching, analysis, and evaluation of a mask
work are recognized as legitimate reverse engineering under §
906(a)(1).196
Section 906(a)(2) of the Chip Act goes an additional step, however. Section 906(a)(2) allows the commercial exploitation of the
results of the reverse engineering effort. The new chip may even
be marketed directly in competition with the original chip. The
industry understanding of reverse engineering presented to Congress included use of unique structures found in the original chip. 197
The legitimate reverse engineer, practicing ongoing engineering to
improve cost and performance, may properly copy such unique
structures and sell them in his own chip under § 906(a)(2).' 98
Such a provision is unique to U.S. intellectual property law. As
noted, copyright law permits only non-competing fair use. Patent
law contains no similar privilege. Rather, anyone who manufac-

192. Brookiree Corp., 977 F.2d at 1567.
193. Id. at 1561.

194. 124 CONG. REc. 37,192 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards introducing the
precursor bill to H.R. 1007, to amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to protect integrated
circuit layouts).
195. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991).

196. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1) (1988).
197. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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tures, uses or sells a patented rticle is liable for infringement. 199
The reverse engineering provision of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act allows the free appropriation of property clearly protected by the exclusive rights of the statute. Thus, reverse engineering destroys the incentives created by the Chip Act.
The broad rationale of the Chip Act, as well as of patents and
copyrights, is to encourage innovation. 2°° By giving the innovator
exclusive rights for a limited fime, these statutes create an incentive
to create. The innovator knows he will have an opportunity to
extract value from his creation. The competitor also 'eceives an
incentive from such protection. Because the competitor is excluded
from use of the protected work, the competitor must innovate a
new solution to the same problem. By this means, the level of
technology is advanced.
Reverse engineering halts this advancement. The competitor is
free to reverse engineer the first chip. The-competitor thus lacks
an incentive to develop a new solution. So long as the competitor
can create a paper trail, the competitor is free to use the unique
structures of the first chip. The innovator, knowing in advance that
his new design is likely to be appropriated, will discontinue innovative work. The return on investment can no longer be realized
when the result is free for the taking.2° '
Based on the legislative history of the reverse engineering defense contained in § 906 of the Chip Act, most copying which does
occur is protected by the affirmative defense. Protected acts include those which the industry understood to be legitimate reverse
engineering in 1983. The only prohibited act is photographic copying of one mask work to produce another. As discussed above
however, such copying is technically feasible only where the pirate
employs process technology identical to that of the legitimate manufacturer. Given the reverse engineering defense, the protection
provided by the Chip Act is narrow ifideed.

199. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
201. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In 1979, some of the leaders of the semiconductor industry
went to Congress with the problem of chip piracy. They insisted
that the future growth of their industry turned- on the incentives
provided by protection of their proprietary rights. At the same
time, other leaders of the industry insisted that such protection
would cut off access to innovation within the industry and 'stifle
competition. These two views precisely describe the dilemma of
all intellectual property law. The incentive to one person's creativity conflicts with access by another to the fruits of that creativity.
In 1983, the industry presented new legislation that permitted
access to new developments by other manufacturers. The industry
was ostensibly unanimous in its support of this legislation. The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 included provisions
such as the reverse engineering defense that kept technology mobile. The net effect of those provisions was to wipe out any incentives to innovation the Chip Act might have created. The resulting
protection created by the Chip Act was very narrow in scope.
The utility of the Chip Act is limited because the Act straddles
the issues of access and incentives. The Act tries to create incentives by granting exclusive rights. At the same time, the Act tries
to maintain access to innovation by exempting copying in the form
of reverse engineering. A 1977 Federal Trade Commission report
cited rapid copying as being very important to the semiconductor
industry's rapid rate of innovation.2° Perhaps unintentionally,
Congress retained this important advantage in the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act by tightly limiting the scope of the Act.

202. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

